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AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
ABSTRACT
Duringthe 1929—33 slide into the Great Depression, the
Federal Reserve took almost no steps to keep themoney supply or
the price level stable. Instead, the Federal Reserve acted -—
disastrously—-asif the gathering Great Depression could not be
avoided, arid was best endured. Such a "uiquidationist" theory of
depressions was in fact common before the Keynesian Revolution,
and was held and advanced by economists like Hayek and
Schumpeter. This paper tries to reconstruct the logic of the
"liquidatjonjst" view. It argues that the perspective was
carefully thought out (although not adequate to the Depression),
may hold some truth in other times arid places, and could be the
core of a more productive research program than currently popular
"real" business cycle theories.
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During the 1929-33 slide into the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve took
almost no steps to keep the money supply or the price level stable. Instead, the
Federai Reserve acted—disastrously—as if the gathering Great Depression
could not be avoided, and was best endured. Such a "liquidationist" theory of
depressions was in fact common before the Keynesian Revolution, and was held
and advanced by economists like Hayek and Schuznpeter. This paper tries to
reconstruct the logic of the "liquidationist" view. It argues that the perspective
was carefully thought out (although not adequate to the Depression), may hold
some truth in other times and places, and could be the core of a more productive
research program than cwrently popular "real" business cycle theories.
I.Introduction
Theinaction of the United States government during the 1929—33 slide into the Great
Depression is, from any of today's various economic perpectives, extraordinarily puzzling. All of
today's points of view on how macroeconomic policy should be conducted hold that the
government should strive to keep some broad nominal aggregate—for new classicals and
monetarists, some measure of the nominal money supply; for Keynesians, nominalaggregate
demand itself—on a stable growth path. If necessary, the central bank shouldpour reserves and
liquidity into the banking system as fast as possible (and the budgetary authorities should cut
taxes and accelerate spending) in order to keep the nominalmoney stock and total nominal
demand from collapsing during incipient depressions.
The Federal Reserve, however, did not push reserves into the bankingsystem during the
1 wish to thank John Leahy, Murray Milgate, Robert Waldmann, andespecially Barry Eichengreen and Randy
Kroszner for helpful discussions, and Hoang Quan Vu for enthusiastic research assistance.Oct 21, 1990 2 "Liquidation"Cycles
1929—33decline, even thoughthenominal money stock fell by a third. Its open market
operations were sporadic and were not always on the side of expansion (Temin, 1974). Factions
in the Federal Reserve argueing for less deflationary policieswere overruled by those who
thought that the economy needed to go through a period of "liquidation" in order to lay the
groundwork for renewed expansion. "Liquidationists" pointed to the short (albeitsharp) 1921
recession, argued that it had laid the groundwork for the prosperity of the 1920's, andpushed for
similar deflationary policies which they hoped would assist the release ofcapital and labor from
socially unproductive activities and lay the groundwork for a similar boom in the 1930's
(Eichengreen, 1991).
These policies turned out to be disastrous in 1929—33. But the current of mind that
supported them was not held by makers of policy alone. Such a "liquidationist" theory of the
function of depressions was a common position for economists to take beforethe Keynesian
Revolution. It was held and advanced by economists as eminentas Hayek, Robbins, and
Schumpeter. In eschewing non-deflationary measures, policy makers in the federalgovernment
were merely listening to what they had been told by "academic scribblers."They truly were
"slaves to some [not yet] defunct economist[s]" (Keynes, 1936).
After the Great Depression, the intellectual victory of theKeynesians was complete. It
reduced even the intellectual foundations of pre-Keynesian businesscycle theory to nibble. It is
not possible, reading either Paul Samuelson (1988) or Milton Friedman(1974), to gain a picture
of what pre-Keynesian business cycle theorywas. Milton Friedman speaks of an atrophied and
rigid caricature of the quantity theory" that could not guide policy. Paul Samuelsonspeaks of a
belief in Say's law which allowed no theoreticalroom for Depressions.
This paper reconstructs the logic andpresents a simple model in the tradition of the
"liquidationist" view—in which depressions are unpleasant but unavoidableepisodes in the
growth of a dynamic economy under uncertainty. In this modelattempts to use policies to keep
investment, employment, and capacity utilization high in a depressionare worse than useless.
They are positively destructive. They magnify trouble for the future.
The task of this paper is worth carrying out for threereasons, stated in order of decreasingOct 21, 1990 3 Liquida:ion"Cycles
importance.First, it is always worthwhile to do the history of economic thought right. Previous
generations of economists were as smartandkeen sighted as the present generation. To
understand what they believed sheds light both on the actual workings of economies and on
economists' present beliefs. Second, the existence of "liquidationism" played a keypart in
motivating public policy decisions not to fight the gathering Great Depression. The story of
economic policy and the economy during the Great Depression cannot be told as it really
happened without a coherent picture of the "liquidationist" perspective that so many had adopted.
Third, business cycles have many possible causes and are shaped by different forces in
different eras; a "liquidationist" perspective may shed light on business cycles at certain times in
certain places—even if it is not helpful for understanding the Great Depression. Modem
economics appears to feel a need to have in its box of tools a set of business cycle models in
which macroeconomic fluctuations are unavoidable and in some sense "optimal"consequences
of the economy's solving a dynamic maximization problem under uncertainty. As it has evolved
to date, the modern "real business cycle" research program has relied on downward shifts in the
production function to generate reduced investment and output. Friedrich Hayek and Joseph
Schumpeter believed in a real business cycle theory, but their framework did not require the
embarrassingly adhoc crutchof large-scale technological regression to account for depressions.
Surely a research program that pursued and extended this line of analysis would be more fruitful
and lead to more progress than the currently active research program.
II.The Great Depression and the liquidationist" Perspective
Fromlate summer 1929 up to the inauguration of Roosevelt, macroeconomic indicators
signalled a grave and immediate need for expansion. The stock market declined in nominal terms
at a rate of 35percentper year, and at 25percentper year in real terms. The price level and the
nominal money stock feli at 8 percent per year. While a flight to quality pushed interest rates on
government securities and on short-run paper issued by credit-worthy firms down, the nominal






Macroeconomic Variables In the Great Depression
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Economic Policy Under Hoover
Throughout this decline—which carried real GNP per worker down to a level 40 percent
below that which it had attained in 1929, and which saw the unemployment riseto take in more
than a quarter of the labor force—the government did nottry to prop up aggregate demand. The
only expansionary fiscal policy action undertaken was the Veterans' Bonus, passed over
President Hoover's veto (Chandler, 1970). That aside, the full-employmentbudget surplus did
not fall over 1929—33 (Brown, 1956).
The Federal Reserve did not use open market operations tokeep the nominal money supply
from falling. Instead the only significant systematic use ofopen market operations was in the
other direction: to raise interest rates and discourage gold outflows after the UnitedKingdom
abandoned the gold standard in the fall of 1931 (Temin, 1974). The Federal Reserve's inaction
did not come about because they did not understand the tools ofmonetary policy. They had used
the tools of monetary policy often in the 1920's, and again in the fall of 1931(Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963). The Federal Reserve's inaction did not come about because of thenecessity to
defend the gold standard. The United States in 1931 heldnearly half the world's gold reserves,Oct 21. 1990 5 "Liquidation" Cycles
andwas far from the point where a looser monetary policy might trigger a successful speculative
attack on the U.S.'s adherence to the gold standard (Eichengreen, 1991).
The Federal Reserve thus knew what it was doing: it was letting the private sector handle
the Depression in its own fashion. It saw the private sector's task as the "liquidation" of the
American economy. And it feared that expansionary monetary policy would impede the
necessary private-sector process of readjustment. Contemplating the wreck of his country's
economy and his own political career in retrospect, Herbert Hoover wrote bitterly about those in
his administration who had advised inaction during the downslide into the Great Depression:
The 'leave-it-alone liquidationists' headed by Secretary of the Treasury
Mellon.. .felt that government must keep its hands off and let the slump
liquidate itself. Mr. Mellon had only one formula: 'Liquidate labor,
liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate'... .He held that
even panic was not altogether a bad thing. He said: 'It will purge the
rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will
come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will
be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less
competent people' (Hoover, 1952, voL 3, p. 30))
Economic Theory During the Hoover Administration
The Hoover administration's and the Federal Reserve's unwillingness to use fiscal of
monetary policy to prop up aggregate demand during the slide into the Great Depression was
approved by the most eminent economists of the day. From Harvard, Seymour Hams argued that
just because the banking system was near collapse was no reason for the Federal Reserve to buy
bonds for cash: "Open market operations are not the most effective method of dealing with...
bank failures, any more than the proper way of filling numerous small holes on the surface of the
earth is to flood the earth with water" (Harris, 1934; p. 104). Joseph Schumpeter argued that
there was a "presumption against remedial measures which work through money and credit....
policies of this class are particularly apt to.. .produce additional trouble for the future"
1Q'! in Wiseley (1977), p. 118, and then iquoted in Kindleberger (1978), pp. 139-40.Oct 21. 1990 6 "liquidation" Cycles
(Schumpeter,1934; P. 20).
Schumpeter (1934) gives the clearest literary exposition of the "liquidationist" line of
argument believed by Mellon, other makers of policy, and economists like Hayek (1931, 1935),2
Harris (1934), and Robbins (1934). Schumpeter begins from the observation that the course of
economic development is never smooth. Investments and enterprises are gambles on the future.
Sometimes these gambles will fail, and the actual future that comes to pass will be one in which
certain investments should not have been made and certain enterprises should not have been
undertaken. The best that can be done in such circumstances is to shut down those production
processes that turned out to have been based on assumptions about future demands that did not
come to pass, or that have been made obsolete by technological development. The liquidation of
such investments and businesses releases factors of production from unprofitable uses; they can
then be redeployed in other sectors of the technologically dynamiceconomy; but without the
initial liquidation the redeployment cannot take place.
It follows, says Schumpeter, that depressions arethisprocess of liquidation and preparation
for the redeployment of resources. From Schumpeter's perspective, "depressions are not simply
evils, which we might attempt to suppress, but.. .forms of something which has to be done,
namely, adjustment to... change." This socially productive function of depressions creates "the
chief difficulty" faced by economic policy makers. For "most of what would be effective in
remedying a depression would be equally effective in preventing this adjustment" (Schumpeter,
1934; p. 16). The process of dynamic economic growth requires that underutilized factors of
production register their availability on factor markets. Policies that stimulate aggregate demand
in recessions keep factors of production engaged in activities that do not produce value inexcess
of their social cost, and so keep factor markets from registering the potential availability of
productive resources for redeployment.
economists were not the only source, even though they were one source, of liquidationist doctrines.
"Austrian" attempts to develop formal business cycle theories, however,didnot mesh well with their approach to
capital theory and the determination of the rate of interest. The businessmen's point of view as laid out by Mellon,
and the theoretical frameworks sketched out by Robbins and Schumpeter are flawlessly ansparent compared to the
opaque writings of Hayek.Oct 21, 1990 7 "liquidation" Cycles
Schumpetergoes so far as to argue that monetary policy does not allow policy makers to
choose between depression and no depression, but between depression now and a worse
depression later. He argues that "inflation.. .pushed far enough [would] undoubtedly turn
depression into the sham prosperity so familiar from European postwar experience but.. .would,
in the end, lead to a collapse worse than the one it was called in to remedy" (Schumpeter, 1934;
p. 16). Hence Schumpeter's "...analysisleads us to believe that recovery is sound only if it does
come of itself. For any revival which is merely due to artificial stimulus leaves part of the work
of depressions undone and adds, to an undigested remnant of maladjustment, new maladjustment
of its own which has to be liquidated in turn, thus threatening business with another [worse)
crisis ahead" (Schumpeter, 1934; p. 20).
Since the basic maladjustment is past investments and lines of business that have turned out
to be socially unproductive and in need of liquidation, the "trouble is fundamentally not with
money and credit." And so stimulative monetary "policies... are particulary apt to keep up, and
add to, maladjustment, and to produce additional trouble for the future" (Schumpeter, 1934; p.
20). Moreover, words like "stimulative" carry a special meaning in this context: if private sector
actions would lead to a fall in, say, the nominal money stock, then a public sector attempt to
counteract the consequences of such private-sector actions by injecting sufficient reserves to hold
the nominal money stock constant would be "stimulative."
Lionel Robbins (1934) even goes so far as to attribute the extraordinary depth and length of
the Great Depression to expansionary monetary policy, writing that: "The moment the boom
broke.. .the Central Banks of the world... set to work to create a condition of easy money... .The
process of liquidation was arrested." And this was a mistake, for:
In.. .a boom many bad business commitments are undertaken.... [Goods]
are produced.. .which it is impossible to sell at a profit. Loans are made
which it is impossible to recover.... [W]hen the boom breaks, these
.commitments are revealed... .Nobody wishes... bankruptcies. Nobody
likes liquidation as such.... [But] when the extent of mal-investment and
over-indebtedness has passed a certain limit, measures which postpone
liquidation only make matters worse (Robbins, 1934, p. 62).Oct 21. 1990 8 'LiquidatioizCycles
Robbins'diagnosis was that the world economy in the 1930's needed more, not less deflation:
"In the present depression we eschew the sharp purge. We prefer the lingering disease." And
Hayek's (1931) rejection of expansionary policies is the same: the belief "that a general crisis
can be averted by extension of credit" is a "popular fallacy." Moreover, "the great expectations
attached to.. .public works in times of depression [are].. .fallacious," for public works also "bring
about all those evil effects which.. .arise when [the] money [supply] is increased."
If markets functioned smoothly the redistributions of labor and machines from socially
unproductive to socially productive lines of enterprise would require neither unemployment nor
idle capacity. Frictions in markets—labor unions, relocation costs, imperfect information, and so
forth—mean that this process of reallocation entails unemployment, slack capacity, and
temporarily reduced production. Before entrepreneurs in expanding lines of business can become
aware of the availability of additional factors of production, such factors of production must be
released from their past uses and spend some time in "inventory." Thus Robbins and Schumpeter
argued that the appropriate policy response was not to try to pump up aggregate demand and so
stop the process of liquidation and reallocation: that process would have to be carried through
eventually; postponing it simply magnified the social costs. Instead, the appropriate policy
response was to reduce the frictions.
This doctrine—that in the long run the Great Depression would win out to have been "good
medicine" for the economy, and that proponents of stimulative policies were shortsighted
enemies of the public welfare—drew anguished cries of dissent from others. The British
economist Ralph Hawtrey scorned those who, like Robbins, wrote at the nadir of the Great
Depression that the greatest danger the economy faced was inflation. It was, Hawtrey said, the
equivalent of "Crying, 'Fire! Fire!' in Noah's flood."3 Milton Friedman (1974) recalled that at
Knight, Simons, and Viner's Chicago such dangerous nonsense was not taught, but he
understood why at Harvard—where such nonsense was taught—bright young economists might
31 owethisquourion to Peter Temin.Oct 21. 1990 9 liquidation" Cycles
rebel,reject their teachers' macroeconomics, and become Keynesians.4
John Maynard Keynes himself (1931) tried to discredit the "liquidationist view" with the
rhetoric of ridicule. He called it an "imbecility" to argue that the "wonderful outburst of
productive energy" during the boom of 1924—29 had made the Great Depression inevitable. And
he spoke of Hayek, Robbins, Schumpeter, and their fellow travelers as:
...austere and puritanical souls [who] regard [the Great Depression].. .as
an inevitable and a desirable nemesis on so much "overexpansion" as they
call it... .It would, they feel, be a victory for the mammon of
unrighteousness if so much prosperity was not subsequently balanced by
universal bankruptcy. We need, they say, what they politely call a
'prolonged liquidation' to put us rigbt. The liquidation, they tell us, is not
yet complete. But in time it will be. And when sufficient time has elapsed
for the completion of the liquidation, all will be well with us again...
(Keynes, 1972; vol. XIII, pt. 1, p. 349)
In spite of opposition, the "liquidationist" view carried the day over virtually the entire
world during 1929—33, and over much of the world during 1933—39. Even governments that had
unrestricted international freedom of action—like France and the United States with their
massive gold reserves, and like Britain after its departure from the gold standard—tended not to
pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policies on the grounds that such would reduce investor
"confidence" and hinder the process of liquidation, reallocation, and the resumption of private
investment (see Temin, 1990; Eichengreen, 1991; Hall, ed., 1989).
The Eclipse of the "Liquidationisi" View
After the Great Depression and World War H the victory of the Keynesians was complete.
Nothing was left of the doctrines of their "liquidationist" opponents—it was not easy to learn
what their doctrines had been.5 Keynesian and monetarist accounts reduced even the intellectual
4Friedman's report on the state of Chicago thought during the early stages of the Depression is supported by Davis
(1971); it is challenged by Patinkin (1978) and by Johnson (1969),
5Salant (1989) is one of the few chroniclers of the Keynesian revolution who refers to "liquidationism," calling it the
"'crime and punishment' theoty of business cycles.Oct 21, 1990 10 "Liquidation" Cycles
foundationsof pre-Keynesian business cycle theory to rubble. Post-World War II
macroeconomics courses and texts taught how one got from a model of Wairasian equilibrium to
one with Keynesian (or monetarist) business cycles (Patinkin, 1982). They did not teach how






United States Economic Growth, 1890—1988
As a resuk, it is not possible reading either Paul Sainuelson or Milton Friedman today to
gain a picture of what pre-Keynesian business cycles were. In asides Friedman (1974) speaks of
an "atrophied and rigid.. .quantity theory" that could not guide policy, and Samuelson (1988)
speaks of a belief in Say's law, which gave no theoretical room for Depressions. The impression
left is that before Keynes economists had a theory of full employment equilibrium but no theory
6Dixn echos of some 'Iiquidarionist" concerns can be heard in some of the internal debate within monetarism over
which monetary aggregate to stabilize. For the early Friedman (1974), this was an empirical question: which
monetary aggregate is the best leading indicator of total nominal demand? For others like Brunner and Meltzer
(1974), or like the later Fiedman (1984). this was a theoretical question: stabilizing which monetary aggregate
corresponds to the government's not distorting private-sector incentives? Pre-Keynesian debates over just what a
"neutral" monetary policy was could become highly scholastic. Hayek (1931), for example, sees a world of
difference between a policy that stabilizes the nominal stock of outside money and one that maintains a stable price
level. The second, he believes, distorts private-sector incentives and inevitably paves the way for crises and
depressions-_he saw one of his major intellectual tasks as the overthrow of "the dogma of the stable price level"
(Hayek, 1931).Oct 21. 1990 11 LJquidaiio,i"Cycles
offluctuations, and so could not provide reasoned support for policies to counteract depressions.
In fact, things were worse: Hayek, Robbins, and Schumpeter had a theory of the business cycle,
but it ruled out as destructive just those policies that monetarists and Keynesians wished to see.
It was unfortunate for the economy that liquidationists were influential, and tried to apply
their theory to the Great Depression where it does not fit. Figure 2 plots the course of real GNP
per capita in the United States since 1890. While other recessions and depressions to be found in
the figure might possibly be interpretable as the liquidation of mistaken investments that
inevitably takes place in a dynamic economy under uncertainty, the Great Depression is too large
for such an interpretation to pass a minimal plausibility test: during the Great Depression real
national product per capita fell back to its level of a quarter century before, and the U.S.'s real
capita stock declined to its level of the early 1920's.
It was unfortunate for the liquidationists as well that they tried to apply their theory to the
Great Depression. Their catastrophic failure left them intellectually bankrupt. Even Lucas who,
seeking intellectual ancestors, has written approvingly of pre-Keynesian theory as based on the
"...idea of mistaken.. .decisions triggered by spurious .. .signals"and on understanding these
mistaken decisions "...as intelligent responses to movements in nominal 'signals' of movements
in the underlying 'real' events we care about and want to react to," has hastened to dismiss the
substantive views of the liquidationist school (Lucas, 1981; pp. 9, 237).
Ill.Modelling Liquidation Cycles
Thissection of this paper develops a simple theoretical model of a "liquidationist" business
cycle, in which large fluctuations in investment are driven by small fluctuations in expectations
of the future. An economy solving a dynamic social maximization problem at times finds itself in
a situation where the "liquidation" of capital, enterprises, and sunk investments is optimal. The
main objective of this section is to "do the history of economic thought right" by translating the
business cycle theories of Hayek and Schumpeter into the same theoretical language in which
other business cycle theories are expressed.Oct 21. 1990 12 liquidasion"Cycles
Inthe process, a certain amount of value is added. For example, Hayek's (1935) Prices and
Production andhis (1931) "'Paradox' of Saving" are monsters with tangled and roundabout
arguments about business cycles thatdonot mesh with the "Austrian" theoretical apparatus
Hayek uses (which had been designed to analyze the equilibrium real rate of interest, and not
business cycles). And Schumpeter was no model builder. Gaps must be filled in to raise their
story to the level of consistency and formalization that modern economists expect. Translation
inevitably involves shifts in meaning, and translation into the language of modem economic
theory especially so. Modem economic theory is a language that enforces a high degree of
consistency and explicit formalization on arguments made in it—a higher degree than either
Hayek or Schumpeter attained in their own presentations of their positin.
BuildingBlocks
Themodel constructed here is by no means complete. it is a model of substantial business
cycle-like investment fluctuations that are, given the shadow costs of resources, due to investors'
optimal attempts to "pierce the veil of time and ignorance" (in Keynes' words). They do not
account for why, once released from the investment sector, productive resources remain idle and
in "inventory" for a time—that is presumably due to various market "frictions."8 This section
thus presents only the "accelerator" portion of a "liquidationist" business cycle.
Assume that the economy is populated by n identical firms, each of which faces costs of




where K1 is the economy-wide total capital stock, i1 denotes the rate of investment by each
7me model of this section also suppresses one current in "liquidationist" thought that saw a share of the
"overbuilding" in a boom as a result of irrational speculative excess that led to investments that were poor bets a
ante.Accordingto this current, there are good decision makers and bad decision makers; all kinds osper in a
boom; only in a recession does the Darwinian market select against bad decision makers; so. without recessions, the
quality of economic leadership would over time become increasingly degraded.
8Pre-Keynesian theorists regarded these frictions as important for assessing the distributional costs of business
cycles, but remote from the central engine of the cycle itself.Oct 21, 1990 13 'Liquida:ion" Cycles
individualfirm, and 6 is an unchanging parameter. Aggregate up to obtain the total rate of
investment I for the economy as a whole:
(2)I =n(i)
Define q81 as the expected present value of the future quasi-rents received from year t
forward by a unit of capital put in place in year s. For simplicity, write q for qtthe expected
present value of the returns from an extra unit of capital put in place today. Assume a constant
real required rate of return r. Setting the cost of a marginal unit of capital equal to its expected
future quasi-rents, iinvestment and (in the absence of depreciation) the proportional growth of the
capital stock will then satisfy:
I K
(3) 6(q1-l) =!_= —
K1K
Now turn to the quasi-rents received by a unit of capital. We assume that, at all times t >s,




wherea( is an index of total productivity of the economy at time t, and K8 is the total amount of
capital installed at all earlier times and in place at time s. Old capital is thus more valuable than
new capital—think of an economy with an unlimited number of investment projects of
decreasing value, the returns to all of which grow as the technological level of productivity
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whereEL is a random variable and Ic dt is a Brownian motion. The proportional growth rate g1 of
at thus locally follows a continuous time random walk, but its drift varies over time.
Two nuisance adjustments to the model are necessary in order to allow for the production
of simple closed-form solutions. The first is the nuisance term a2/(r-g) in equation (6).9 The
second is a small nuisance adjustment to the specification: whenever capital is liquidated and
disinvestment takes place, the profits from the disinvestment are received by middlemen: owners
of the capital receive only the expected present value of future quasi-rents, and not the net
liquidation value after de-installation costs.10
To derive the shadow value of capital, consider first as a heuristic device the discrete-time
version of our continuous time model and then let the duration of each discrete period approach
zero. Break time into periods of length r, and substitute discrete random variables 'It(E) for the
continuous time stochastic terms.
Investments in capital must earn the required return of r in expectation:
(7) (1 +tr)41 = +Ep
Defining a new function 0:
(8) =
andsubstituting into (7):
(9) (1 + tr) 0(g1) =x+ (1+ rg)E1{O(g1 -ta/(r-g1)+
Taking a Taylor expansion:
9 The nuisance term is quantitatively insignificant for the parameter values used in the simulations below, it is
typically on the order of 0.008 % per year. It is included only in order to obtain simple closed-form expressions for
q.
t0This adjustment allows us to ignore the 'option value" generated by the existence of the option of liquidating sunk







Dividingby tandletting t approach zero:




(11) has a fundamental solution:
(12)O(g =





follow. Equation (14) gives the cun-ent q, the shadow value of the marginal investment project
as a function of the capital/technology ratio K/a1 and the expected future growth rate g.
Dynamic Response to a Single Shock
Insight into the dynamic behavior of this model can be gained by considering the response
of the model to a lone unanticipated shock. Figure 3 presents the deterministic dynamics of the
model in response to a unique once-and-for-all shock.
The q(K) schedule represents the current value of q—the present value of expected quasi-
rents earned by the marginal unit of capital—given the required rate of return r, the current rate
of technology growth gt. and the current value of K/a, the capital stock relative to the current
level of technology. The economy is always on the q(K) locus, at a point determined by thecurrent value of the state variable K/cc. The (K/a) is constant locus, atq = I+ g1/&,consistsof
those points at which investment takes place just fast enough to keep the capital stock growing at
the same rate as the technology parameter a.
Ifthe economy is to the right of point A on the q(K) locus, the capital stock is not
increasing fast enough to keep K/a constant, and the economy drifts to the left along the q(K)
curve. If the economy is to the left of point A, q is high and induces enough investment to make
K/a rise and the economy drifts to the right. In the absence of shocks, the deterministic
dynamics of the system lead it to come to rest at point A, with K/cc= (r -g)(l+ gtI6))'and
q = 1 + g/6.
K/a = 0 (before)
— K/a = 0 (otter)
C(er) q( (before)
Oct 21. 1990 16 Liquida:io?t"Cycles
Figure 3






Response to a Permanent Negative Shock to Future Growth
'- p
K/aOct 21, 1990 17 'Liquidation"Cycles
Nowconsider how this model reacts to a previously-unanticipated permanent negative
shock to the rate of technological progress gt, as plotted in figure 4. The constant (K/a) locus
shifts downward— because of the slower growth in a, a lower level of q than before keeps K/ct
constant. In addition, the q(K) locus shifts to the left: since the new denominator of (14) is lage,
the same value of q requires a smaller value of K/a.
For suitable parameter values (g >(r-8)12)),this reduction in the expected future growth
rate reduces the deterministic fixed point value of K/a. In response to the shock, the economy
jumps to point B, and disinvestment begins. The rate of growth of K/a becomes negative: given
the new rate of technological change, the most recent units of capital built were not worth their
resource cost. In the absence of additional shocks, K/a falls until the economy reaches
equilibrium at a new, lower level of K/a, denoted by C in figure 4. And as long as the value of q
at point B is less than one, optimal adjustment requires absolute disinvestment—not just a
slowing of the pace of investment.
Comparison with Standard q-Theory Dynamics
The previous subsection has laid out a "liquidationist" account of how bad news about
future productivity growth plausibly causes a fall in the demand for investment goods and a fall
in the stock of capital as well. Properly augmented by "frictions" that cause factors of production
released from the capital goods sector to spend time in "inventory" before they are reemployed in
other sectors, it could serve as a model of the business cycle." The "accelerator" in the
subsection above provides a rationale for why reallocation of resources from consumption to
investment goods sectors and back again is pervasive. The economy, maximizing a suitable
objective function, must determine how much of its resources to devote to capital without
knowing what the long run productivity growth rate will turn out to be ex post. The economy
110ne such account of how the reallocation of productive resources across sectors could lead to unemployment is
given by Lilien (1982).Oct 21, 1990 18 Liquida:ion"Cycles
mustguess; inevitably there will be times it discovers that it has overestimated future growth and
so built capital "ahead of demand." The subsequent process of adjustment sees disinvestment and
"liquidation."
Importantly, note that the fall in investment and the capita] goods stock does not in any
sense rely on short-term technological regression. The level of technology that can be used in
production does not fall. Instead, recognition that the future rate of growthoftechnology will be
slower carries with it a realization that there is an "overhang" of capital, and that old capital
should be scrapped and new investment projects postponed until this capital overhang has been
absorbed.
It is worthwhile to compare the response of investment to news about the future rate of
growth of productivity in this model to the response of investment in a standard model of
investment dynamics like that of Blanchard-Fischer (1988). In the Blanchard-Fischer model there
is no advantage to having been the "first mover" in the accumulation of capital. All units of
capital earn the same quasi-rents and compete on equal footing. As a result, bad news about
future productivity growth leads to a slowing-down of investment, but it never leads to a fall in
the desired ratio of capital to the productivity parameter a or to the desired scrapping of existing
capital.
Figure5
Response to a Permanent Negative Shock to Future Growth
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in which all units of capital in place at time t earn the same quasi-rent, given by the quotient of
the technology parameter a1 and the capital stock in place K1. News that future productivity
growth will be lower shifts the K/a =constantlocus down: a slower rate of investment is now
sufficient to keep the economy on its steady-state growth path. The q =constantlocus does not
shift. Since the long-run saddle point equilibrium in figure 5 is given by the intersection of theq
=constantand the K/a =constantcurves, it follows immediately that the desired long-run K/a
ratio rises—it cannot fall—in response to bad news about future productivity growth. In the
Blanchard-Fischer model, therefore, a sudden fall not just in the growth rate but in the level of
technology is required to generate a fall in the desired capital stock, and absolute disinvestment.
Dynamic Response to a Process of Shocks
Themodel has provided a consistent and formalized example of what Schumpeter and
others were talking about when they attributed recessions to the realization, in a stochastic
environment, that the economy had accumulated either "too much" or "the wrong kind" of
capital. In response to a stochastic shock process, the model economy does indeed exhibit
"business cycles." At times good news about future growth leads to an investment boom, as
entrepreneurs hasten to put in place a large chunk of new capital that is expected to be profitable
given the forecast future path of productivity. And at times the economy goes into depressions:
news about future growth rates reveals that the capital stock has been overbuilt, and that there
will be a substantial period of time during which it will be optimal for there to be no investment
or disinvestment.
Figures 6 and 7 plot simulated investment cycles driven by news about future growth rates.
Figure 6 presents four simulation runs. For each run it presents four panels, plotting the timeOct 21, 1990 20 "Liquidation' Cycles
Simulated Time Paths
FIgure 6
of investment, Growth, Capital, and Productivity
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pathsof investment, of the growth rate of the productivity parameter a, of the capital stock K,
and of the level of the productivity parameter a. Figure 7 presents the time paths of investment
from sixteen simulation ruris.2
The model does illustrate how investment booms and slumps can arise out of the optimal
dynamic response of a growing economy to news about the future—and the model does not
require the ad hocassumptionof technological regress, but merely the much more reasonable
assumption that the path of future productivity growth is uncertain. The simulation runs thus
reveal an important lesson. The underlying "fundamental" in the simulations—the level of the
technology parameter a—follows a very smooth path over rime. There are substantial costs of
adjusting K: too high a rate of investment or disinvestment in the short run quickly becomes very
expensive, and there are strong incentives to smooth out the path of investment over time. Yet
even though the underlying fundamental is smooth and there are substantial incentives to smooth
investment, the actual time paths of investment plotted in the simulation runs are sharp, jagged,
and variable. These jagged paths are optimal in the assumed stochastic environment. Smoothness
of the path of fundamentals to the eye and incentives to smooth the control variable do not
necessarily imply that the optimal path for the control variable will itself be smooth to the eye.'3
The simple model constructed here is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, this is by no
means a full model of the business cycle. It accounts for why desired investment spending might
fluctuate a significant amount given a constant shadow cost of using resources to produce
investment goods, but it provides no account of why resources appear to lie idle after their
release from the investment-goods sector, or for why—given that they will lie idle—their market
cost does not fall enough to make continued investment profitable. Second, the model fails to
12Parameter values in the simulation runs e illustrative only: the discount rate r is set at 7.5%, the responsiveness &
of investment to shifts in qisset at 0.2, the initial rate of growthof productivity is set at 2% per period, and each
period y is subject to a permanent shock r with standard deviation 0.6%.
a sense, this is the same point as that made by Kleidon (1986). Investment responds not to movements in a but
to movements in the expected discounted value of all future a's. Even though a shifts only a small amount from
period to period, the unstable nature of future productivity growth means that the expected discounted value of all
future a's shifts substantially.Oct 21, 1990 25 Liquidation" Cycles
deal sufficiently with the irreversibility of investment—capital can be broken down into
consumption goods using the same technology with which it is built up. Schumpeter and others
placed great stress on how recessions occured when the economy had not only "too much" but
also the "wrong kinds" of capital goods. Third, the model does not deal with the interaction of
the monetary sector with the real economy—an interaction that many liquidationists considered
key in preventing the early recognition of overbuilding.14
IV.Implications
EconomicPolicy in a "Liquidazionist" Framework
From the perspective of an economist who believes the model of business cycles laid out in
section ifi, the policy recommendations of Hayek, Mellon, Robbins, Schumpeter and others—to
let the private sector deal with the Great Depression, and to at all costs avoid any "inflationary"
policy that might prop up real aggregate demand—appear sound and reasonable.
Suppose that the government takes active policy steps to prop up aggregate demand and
keep investment high once the depression begins by buying bonds, supporting their price, and so
reducing the real interest rate below its long-nm equilibrium value so that stock prices and
investment will remain high. What are the consequences of high investment? Since the
productivity parameter a is no longer growing rapidly, high investment implies that K/a steadily
increases. As long as the government maintains its stimulative policy, the economy moves to the
right along the (old) K/a =constantlocus, from point A toward point D in figure 8.
Eventually the policy of easy money must break down. The government cannot hold the
real interest rate below its equilibrium value of r indefmitely, and cannot support real stock prices
at their boom levels indefinitely. Should it try to do so, it will have to print larger and larger
Another defect is that the model has no space for agents who do not optimally process information.
"Liquidalionists" had no methodological predisposition against the belief that some investors make "mistakes" not
only ex post but also ex ante, and that a depression could become necessary not only because of bad fundamental
news but also because of a central bank failure to check irrational speculative excess. This branch of the
'liquidationist" perspective is suppressed here.Oct 21, 1990 26 Liquidation" Cycles
quantitiesof money and a hyperinflation will result. So eventually—say when the economy is at
point D—the easy money policy will (suddenly and unexpectedly) break down, and the real
interest rate will revert to its equilibrium value of r.
At that moment the stock market crashes, and the economy jumps instantaneously to point
E in figure 8. When the government began its easy money policy, the economy had a capital
overhang—caused by bad news about future productivity growth—equal to the difference in the
horizontal coordinates of points B and C. If the government had let the private sector handle the
Depression, a period of liquidation would have ensued during which the economy would have
progressed from B to C.
After the easy money policy has broken down, the capital ovethang is much greater—equal
to the difference in the horizontal coordinates of points E and C. The period of "liquidation" and
depression that will ensue following the end of the easy money policy will be much more
prolonged, and much more painful, than the original recession would have been had the
government not tried to fight it.
Government policy has interfered with relative prices, and has led to the piling up of more
and more capital at just that moment when the shadow value of capital was very low and the
market system was broadcasting the signal that the economy had overinvested and needed a
Figure 8
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period of quiescence to work off its capital overhang. Instead, the government blocked this
message with its easy money policy, and so created a capital overhang of much larger
proportions. Originally, just that part of the economy's capital between points B and C wasnot
yielding sufficient quasi-rents to cover its cost of production; after the easy money policy, all of
the economy's capital between points E and C is not worth what it cost toput in place.
This—or a less formalized doctrine aldn to this—was the argument that lay behind the
aversion to stimulative policies that political figures like Mellon and academic figures like
Schumpeter felt during the Great Depression. The argument is logically consistent if the premise
about the cause of depressions is accepted. But why were so many willing toaccept the premise?
Certainly Keynes (1931; pp. 347—8) devoted a substantial part of his Chicago lecture on the
Depression to arguing that the boom of 1925—29 had not produced an economy with an
unsustainable or an unbalanced capital structure:
While some part of the investment.. .was doubtless ill judged and
unfruitful, there can.. .be no doubt that the world was enormously enriched
by the constructions of ..A925 to 1929; its wealth increased in these five
years by as much as in any other ten or twenty years of its histoty.... [O]n
the whole, I see little sign of any serious want of balance such as is alleged
by some authorities. The rates of growth [of different sectorsi .. .seemto
me.. .to have been in as good a balance as one could have expected... .A
few more quinquennia of equal activity might, indeed, have brought us
near to the economic Eldorado where all our reasonable economic needs
would be satisfied.
Late-Nineteenth Century Railroad Cycles
One possible answer is that the "liquidationist" point of view is not completely without
merit. In countries that are undergoing rapid industrial revolutions and seeing rapid increases in
their capital/output ratios, swings in investment driven by news about future growth rates will be
proportionately more important than in countries that have already undergone their industrial








Inthe United States, the half century before World War II saw the non-agricultural
capital/output ratio nearly double (Abramovitz and David, 1973). A "liquidationist" perspective
might well have been a relatively good model for such pre-Worid War I business cycles in the
United States (or in other rapidly industrializing countries like Germany). If the causes of
business cycles can be characterized as "Schumpeterian," "Keynesian," or "monetarist," then an
economy like the pre-WWI U.S. would presumably see "Schumpeterian" causes at their relative
maximum of importance.
For example, in 1870 and 1871, U.S. railroad construction reached its first post-Civil War
peak. The number of miles of operated railroad in the U.S., then around 50,000, grew at about
twelve percent per year. The construction of these 6,000 miles of railroad track each year (up
from approximately 600 miles/year during the Civil War) required approximately one-tenth of
America's non-farm paid labor force, and perhaps half of the production of America's capital
goods industries. Four years later, in 1875, U.S. railroad construction had collapsed. In 1875,
operated railroad mileage grew at only three percent—less than 2,000 miles of railroad were
built. Railroad construction involved less than three percent of America's non-farm paid labor
force, and consumed perhaps fifteen percent of the potential production of America's capital
goods industries.
350 860 1870 1880Oct 21, 1990 29 "liquidation' Cycles
Asfigure 9 shows, two more substantial but irregular waves of railroad construction, one
peaking in 1881-2 and a second smaller wave peaking in 1887, passed through the American
economy before 1890. Each required a substantial expansion of capacity in the railroad
construction sector's supplier industries—iron and steel for rails, timber for ties, mechanical
equipment for locomotives and cars, furniture to equip the Pullman Co. cars to carry passengers
on the new lines, and so forth—and a redirection of capacity from other industries and from idle
status to the production of railroad lines. Each wave of construction also required the redirection
of perhaps one million workers to railroad construction, and as the wave passed their reallocation
into other sectors or into relative idleness. These swings in railroad construction, and the swings
in total product associated with them, are what contemporaries first described by the term
"business cycles."
Figure10
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Itis hard to interpret such late nineteenth-century railroad cycles as caused by the forces to
which business cycles are often attributed today. The small government did not serve as a source
of more than trivial fiscal shocks. There was no central bank to mistakenly squeeze off
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goesthe wrong way: the post-1871 fall in railroad construction is associated not with rising but
with steeply falling interest rates, as figure 10 shows. It is difficult to attribute the railroad cycles
to disturbances in financial markets: the financing of railroads was the predominant business of
financial markets, and financial crises tended to result from downturns in railroad construction,
not to cause such downturns.
Nor can late nineteenth century railroad cycles be attributed to sudden disturbances on the
supply side. There do not appear to be any candidate negative technology, cost, or supply shocks
to account for the collapse of U.S. railroad investment in the 1870's arid 1880's; American
workers and firms did not forget how to build railroads efficiently, the market for crop exports
did not collapse, and wages did not suddenly rise by unusual amounts.
By default, therefore, a "Schumpeterian" view of U.S. late nineteenth century railroad
cycles appears as plausible as any. There wastremendousuncertainty about the long run growth
of the American economy, especially where the settlement of the West is concerned. Railroads
are investments that are very sensitive to the growth of the region that they serve. Entrepreneurs
did risk their fortunes and futures on their assessment of the quasi-rents to be earned from the
traffic on a particular railroad line. Sometimes they guessed wrong: the bond house of Jay
Cooke and Co. failed because it had advanced far more money for the construction of the
Northern Pacific than it could recoup by selling the Northern Pacific's bonds. The failure of Jay
Cooke and Co. ushered in the panic of 1873 and the subsequent depression, which did not lift
until five years had passed and railroad construction resumed.
At the very least, the railroad booms and busts of the late nineteenth century are not
inconsistent with a "liquidationist" perspective. When long run rates of growth are unstable,
investment for the future ought to be jagged, and ought to see periods of rapid expansion coupled
with periods of quiescence and disinvestment. This was Schumpeter's insight.'5
15Large jagged swings in the rate of invesunent drivenbynews about expected future growth may have wider
relevance. Barsky and De Long (1989, 1990) argued that an overwhelming proportion of decade-to-decade swings in
the U.S. stock market in the twentieth century could be accounted for as consequences of changes in investors'
expectations of the long run future dividend growth rate, tied to shifts in productivity and GNP growth rates as well.
Blanchard, Rhee. and Summers (1990) find a suong relationship between the stock maitet and investmentOct 21, 1990 31 iiquidaxion"Cycles
Inthis context, it does not seem surprising that "liquidationist" theories became popular
around and after the turn of the twentieth century. They promised to make sense of relatively
recent historical experience. When the Great Depression came, theorists like Robbiris and
Schumpeter tried to make sense of the Great Depression in the same framework. With hindsight
we can see that the Great Depression was an order of magnitude larger than previous
depressions, that the Great Depression was not a period of accelerated structural change, and that
as a result it is difficult to sustain an interpretation that sees the Great Depression as a necessary
period of economic housecleaning. Schumpeter and his school were, it may be, working within a
macroeconomic framework that had once been reasonable, but had become inappropriate and
that proved unhelpful in understanding and guiding policy during the Great Depression.
Real Business Cycles
Academic economics in the past decade has seen the growth of "real business cycle"
theories in the aftermath of the decline of the "monetary misperceptions" school of business
cycle analysis (Lucas, 1986). It is somewhat puzzling that such theories have rested their
specifications of the production function on the observed behavior of the aggregate Solow
residual. This has given a prominent place in "real business cycle" theory to inward shifts in the
production function—total factor productivity regression—as the mechanism behind depressions.
Such a theory is, from some perspectives, profoundly unhelpful. The phenomena under
study are immediate consequences of the assumption that technology regresses, and the
assumption closes off further investigation of the empirical microfoundations of the theory. This
research program has seen relatively few attempts to understand how technologies of production,
market structures, and stochastic shocks might interact to produce endogenous declines in
measured total factor productivity. Some attempts as have been made to construct credible
over the twentieth century. To the extent that the stock market and investment are responding to the same factors and
that Large stock market swings are driven by shifting expectations of future growth, there appears to be a possibility
that "Schumpeterian" investment dynamics have played a role in shaping the slrength of business cycles, even if
they have not determined their timing.Oct 21, 1990 32 "Liquidation" Cycles
empiricalmicrofoundations (Lilien, 1982; Brainerd and Cutler, 1990) for such theories. And
some attempts have been made to construct theoretical building blocks (Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1989) for market-clearing business cycle models. These attempts have not been well
received by real business cycle theorists, who appear to argue that the declines in measured total
factor productivity during downturns are the only microfoundations needed (Prescott, 1989).
Such a reliance on an ad hoc specification of technology is strange given the availability of
the Hayek-Robbins-Schumpeter frameworks, which do not rely on large-scale total factor
productivity regression to account for depressions, and which have been available for
revivification. Since the specification of technology has been the principal stumbling block to
progress in real business cycle theory, it seems likely a framework like Schumpeter's—which
promises to generate "optimal" and "real" business cycles without requiring large-scale
technological regression—could support a much more productive and progressive research
program than that of present real business cycle theory.
V.Conclusion
Thispaper has two principal themes and one subsidiary theme. The principal themes are
closely interlinked and deal, respectively, with the history of economic thought and with
economic history. They are, first, that getting the history of economic thought right requires a
sympathetic understanding of what the "liquidationist" perspective was and, second, that getting
the history of economic policy during the Great Depression right requires an understanding of the
strong hold over men's minds exercised by the "liquidationist" perspective. The subsidiary theme
is that, when considered as "real business cycle" theories, Schumpeter (1934) appears much
more attractive than Prescott (1984).
The Great Depression is one of the principal axes on which the history of the twentieth
century turns. One of the most astonishing features of the Great Depression, from our point of
view, is the extreme unwillingness of governments to take active steps to stimulate their
economies during the slide of 1929—33. Those deciding on economic policy during the GreatOct 21, 1990 33 'Liquidation"Cycles
Depression acted like "madmen in authority" (Keynes, 1936). And they were ruled by the
theories of academic scribblers who built up and advanced the "liquidationist" perspective.
Advocates of the "liquidationist" perspective argued that the Great Depression had come
about because the boom of the 1920's had led to a capital overhang, and that investment could
not proceed until the pace of productivity growth and of depreciation had eliminated this excess
of produced means of production. By and large, the policy recommendations of the
"liquidationists" were followed for much of the Depression.
A large proportion of the capital stock was indeed liquidated. According to Blanchard,
Rhee, and Summers (1990), by 1936 all of net capital accumulation over 1924—29 had been
erased. Yet the years between 1936 and World War II did not see a restoration of normal levels
of activity and unemployment. This is as decisive an experiment as could be wished for:
whatever caused the Great Depression and no matter how applicable "liquidationist" theory may
be to other episodes, the Great Depression was not caused by an overhang of unproductive
capital for the Depression outlasted any plausible such overhang.
It was, therefore, bad advice that academic economists like Robbins and Schumpeter gave
central banks and treasuries during the Great Depression. it is disturbing that so many very smart
economists could give such irrelevant and unproductive policy advice in such a serious situation.
It is also disturbing that the advice they gave sounds not unreasonable given their theoretical and
empirical knowledge of market economies. The market economy's allocation of resources
between consumption and investment doesinvolvethe market's solving a dynamic maximization
problem in a stochastic environment. The arrival of news about future productivities and
opportunities doesimplythat there will be times at which new information reveals that recent
investment projects will not repay their social costs. In such situations, the correct policy is
indeed to help the process of structural readjustment and sectoral reallocation along, and not to
delay reallocation by pumping up demand to freeze production in its old pattern.
The advocates of the "liquidationist" point of view during the Great Depression were
mistaken, but they were not crazy. Their failure to recognize the severity and scope of the Great
Depression is a severe indictment: Schumpeter (1934) gives no sign of recognizing that 1929—33Oct 21, 1990 34 'Liquidation" Cycles
wasany larger than 1907—08, yet the Great Depression as five times as deep and five times as
long—twenty-five times larger in total magnitude.16 In standard histories (Chandler, 1973) or
accounts of the Keynesian Revolution (Gaibraith, 1965), the policy recommendations given by
the liquidationists appear to be nothing but incoherent barbarisms that were, for some
inexplicable reason, believed. Such an interpretation gets the history of economic thought wrong.
It also creates a climate of undue smugness among the present generation of economists. It is one
thing to compare past barbarism to present civilization. It is another to reflect that Robbins and
Schumpeter were as smart and as hard working as anyone in more recent generations of
economists—and they were also as sure that they were right.
16Howev, he lacked the base of quantitative data on the cotuscofthe business cycle that we take for grantedOct 21, 1990 35 Liquidai1on"Cycles
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